Travel time, at the employer’s direction, to a work location other than the regular one constitutes “working time”
CJEU Judgment in Case C-420/24, “Elie Radu” Road Workers’ Union
On 22 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or the “Court”) issued its judgment in Case C-420/24[1] , following a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by the Iași Court of Appeal in which the CJEU was asked to clarify whether the time spent by an employee with a fixed workplace traveling, at the employer’s direction, to another location where tasks are performed falls within the concept of “working time” as defined in Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 4, 2003, concerning certain aspects of the organization of working time (the “Directive”). The judgment is consistent with established case law, which has defined working time as an autonomous concept of Union law, based on objective criteria, and which the Court of Justice has gradually developed[2] .
In the Tyco ruling[3], the CJEU classified as working time the travel time incurred by workers without a fixed or habitual place of work between their homes and the locations of their first and last clients. In the STAS-IV ruling[4] , the Court extended this classification to round trips that workers are required to make at a time set by the employer and using the employer’s vehicle, from a specific location determined by the employer to the place where the characteristic work provided for in the employment contract is performed. The judgment in Case C-420/24 takes the next step and applies the same reasoning to an employee whose contract provides for a fixed workplace but whose regular duties routinely involve activities outside that workplace, as directed by the employer.
Factual situation and the preliminary questions
The “Elie Radu” Road Workers’ Union brought the action on behalf of its member BZ, an employee of CNAIR serving as head of the “Investments, major repairs, and disasters” department within the Iași Regional Roads and Bridges Directorate, who had a fixed workplace in Iași under his contract. Between June 8 and 15, 2021, on the orders of the regional director, he traveled to inspect construction sites in Suceava, Botoșani, and Focșani, as well as to the headquarters in Bucharest, covering over 1,500 km in a vehicle provided by the employer and, for the trip to Bucharest, with a driver; these trips took place outside of his regular work schedule. The employer requested that he correct his time sheet and refused to pay for the 31.5 hours related to the trips, arguing that these did not constitute periods during which the employee was performing his duties and responsibilities, within the meaning of Article 111 of Law No. 53/2003—the Labor Code, as republished, with subsequent amendments and additions (the “Labor Code”)[5]. In its decision of 20 July 2022, the Iași Tribunal dismissed the claim due to insufficient evidence, holding that the mere mention in the travel order of the departure and arrival times, in the absence of an activity report or a travel log, does not prove that overtime was worked and that, in any case, the internal procedure agreed upon with the unions and the Labor Code would require a prior request for compensation in the form of time off[6] .
On appeal, noting the existence of inconsistent judicial practice regarding the application of the Tyco case law to workers with a fixed workplace[7] , the Iași Court of Appeal referred two questions to the CJEU:
- whether the period during which an employee travels, outside normal working hours, to a location other than his or her fixed or usual place of work in order to perform his or her work or duties there in accordance with the employer’s instructions, as well as the return trip, constitutes “working time” within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Directive;
- whether Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the “Charter”) and Article 6(b) of the Directive, which limit the average working time to 48 hours per seven-day period, including overtime, preclude national legislation that does not take those hours into account when determining the threshold for average weekly working time for the purpose of calculating overtime[8] .
The CJEU’s rationale and ruling
As a preliminary matter, the CJEU declared the first question admissible, despite CNAIR’s objections regarding the lack of formal transposition of the Directive and the fact that the payment of certain sums of money would not be governed by it, noting that the relevance of the questions is assessed by the national court and that, as the latter pointed out, although remuneration falls under domestic law, the resolution of the dispute requires a preliminary determination of the legal nature of travel time[9] . By contrast, the second question was declared inadmissible, since the order for reference did not set forth either the grounds for the court’s doubts regarding the interpretation of Article 6(b) of the Directive and Article 31( (2) of the Charter, nor the connection between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings—requirements imposed by Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice[10] .
On the merits, the Court recalled that the concepts of “working time” and “rest period,” as defined in Article 2(1) and (2) of the Directive, are mutually exclusive, as the Directive does not provide for an intermediate category, and Article 2 is not among the provisions from which Member States may derogate[11] . After noting that it is irrelevant whether the travel takes place outside the normal working hours[12] , the Court examined whether the three constituent elements of the concept of “working time” were met:
- First, the employee is performing his or her duties, since the employer discretionarily determines or modifies the destination and conditions of travel, issues travel orders, and monitors travel logs, such that the travel is “inextricably linked” to his or her duties[13].
- Second, the employee remains at the employer’s disposal and is unable to change the date or destination of the trips, to freely dispose of his time, or to pursue his own interests, even if the vehicle is driven by a driver; the intensity of the activity is irrelevant[14].
- Third, although the contract provides for a fixed place of work, inspections and meetings outside that location form an integral part of BZ’s usual duties, with travel being inherent to the performance of those duties; during such travel, the employee is away from his social and family environment, so that, according to the Court, this element also appears to be met[15] . All of these findings are subject to the specific verification that the referring court must carry out.
In its general response to the first question, the Court held that Article 2(1) of the Directive must be interpreted to mean that “the time a worker spends traveling, including outside his or her normal working hours, to and from a workplace designated by his employer, other than his fixed or usual workplace, in order to perform his work or duties at that location in accordance with his employer’s instructions, must be regarded as ‘working time’ within the meaning of that provision”[16] .
Practical implications
The main contribution of the ruling lies in the fact that the reference to the place of work in the contract, although it constitutes a mandatory element of the individual employment contract pursuant to Art. 17, para. (3)(b) and para. (4) of the Labor Code, is not, in and of itself, decisive for the classification of travel time. The employer cannot rely on the stipulation of a fixed workplace to exclude from working time travel that the employer itself has ordered; rather, the decisive factors are the objective criteria of the concept of working time, assessed based on how the employment relationship is actually carried out. The judgment does not address the usual daily commute between home and the fixed workplace; the rule that this does not, in principle, constitute working time does not appear to be affected, as the ruling applies exclusively to travel to a location other than the fixed or usual workplace.
For Romanian courts, the Court’s interpretation is binding not only in the main proceedings but in all cases raising the same issue of interpretation, without precluding the possibility of a new referral to the Court[17] , and its effects take effect, in principle, as of the date the interpreted provision entered into force[18] . Although Article 111 of the Labor Code (in the version applicable to the dispute; currently, Article 111(1)) differs in wording from the definition in the Directive, particularly in its reference to the period during which the employee “performs work,” the national court is required to interpret it in accordance with EU law, within the limits of the principle of consistent interpretation, which cannot lead to an interpretation contra legem[19] . Such an interpretation calls for the rejection of the restrictive view that working time encompasses only periods of actual work performance.
It should be emphasized, however, that the Directive does not regulate remuneration, which remains subject to national law[20] . Classifying travel time as working time has indirect effects: hours thus classified that exceed the normal working hours provided for in Article 112 of the Labor Code may constitute overtime within the meaning of Article 120(1), to the extent that the national court, interpreting these provisions in accordance with the Directive, so holds. In such a case, they are subject to the rule of compensation with paid time off within the following 90 calendar days and, alternatively, payment of a negotiated compensation of at least 75% of the base salary. With regard to evidence, travel orders, trip logs, and the employer’s instructions become relevant evidence, and employers should review their records of working time maintained in accordance with Article 119(1).
Conclusions
The judgment in Case C-420/24 reinforces the objective and functional approach to the concept of working time. Furthermore, the judgment provides courts with an important guideline for interpreting Article 111 of the Labor Code, subject to a case-by-case assessment, while leaving the national legislature and social partners the freedom to determine the specific terms for compensating such time.
[1] CJEU, judgment of October 22, 2026, Case C-420/24, “Elie Radu” Road Workers’ Union, ECLI:EU:C:2026:893 (hereinafter “the C-420/24 judgment”). The judgment was delivered by the Sixth Chamber, without an opinion from the Advocate General, and the language of the proceedings was Romanian.
[2] See, among others, CJEU, judgment of October 3, 2000, Case C-303/98, Simap, ECLI:EU:C:2000:528; CJEU, judgment of September 9, 2003, Case C-151/02, Jaeger, ECLI:EU:C:2003:437; CJEU, judgment of December 1, 2005, Case C-14/04, Dellas et al., ECLI:EU:C:2005:728; CJEU, judgment of February 21, 2018, Case C-518/15, Matzak, ECLI:EU:C:2018:82.
[3] CJEU, judgment of September 10, 2015, Case C-266/14, Federación de Servicios Privados del sindicato Comisiones Obreras (“Tyco”), ECLI:EU:C:2015:578.
[4] CJEU, judgment of October 9, 2025, Case C-110/24, STAS-IV, ECLI:EU:C:2025:768.
[5] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 10–14. For the relevant national provisions (Articles 111, 112, and 120 of the Labor Code), see paras. 7–9 of the judgment.
[6] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 15–16.
[7] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 19–21.
[8] Judgment C-420/24, para. 23.
[9] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 24–33.
[10] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 34–39.
[11] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 41–44, with reference to the STAS-IV judgment, paras. 20–23.
[12] Judgment C-420/24, para. 45.
[13] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 46–50.
[14] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 51–56; see also CJEU, judgment of October 30, 2025, Case C-373/24, Ramavić, ECLI:EU:C:2025:842, para. 53.
[15] Judgment C-420/24, paras. 57–61, with reference to the Tyco judgment, para. 43, and the Ramavić judgment, para. 58.
[16] Judgment in Case C-420/24, para. 62 and the operative part.
[17] See, by analogy, CJEU, judgment of May 13, 1981, Case 66/80, International Chemical Corporation, ECLI:EU:C:1981:102 (rendered with regard to judgments declaring the invalidity of an act); see also Art. 148, paras. (2) and (4) of the Romanian Constitution.
[18] CJEU, judgment of March 27, 1980, Case 61/79, Denkavit Italiana, ECLI:EU:C:1980:100.
[19] CJEU, judgment of October 5, 2004, joined cases C-397/01–C-403/01, Pfeiffer et al., ECLI:EU:C:2004:584, paras. s. 119–120 (rendered in interpretation of Directive 93/104/EC, codified by Directive 2003/88/EC ).
[20] Tyco judgment, paras. 47–49; judgment in Case C-420/24, para. 31.
